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This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an external auditor and a 
manager of a client firm when the incentives for both agents are implicit as in the career 
concerns framework. The main result is that the earning management and the audit effort are 
decreasing over time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both agents in 
spite of a managers first mover advantage. This suggests that the audit effort should be higher 
when the auditor is an emerging firm and the future employment opportunities for the client 
firm´s manager are larger. 
 
Key words. Contract theory; career concerns; reputation; auditing. 
 
Journal of Economic Literature. Classification Number: C73, G38, D82, D83. 
 
                                                           
∗ I thank Luis Úbeda for helpful comments and insigthful discussions. This work has also benefited 
from the participants in the 32th Conference on Spanish Economic Association (Granada, 2007). Any 
remaining shortcoming is, of course, my own responsability. 
† Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, C. Madrid 126, Getafe, 28903, 
Madrid, Spain. E-mail: yportill@eco.uc3m.es, Tel: +34 (41) 2 20 31 17, Fax: +34 (41) 2 52 20 55 
 
Audit Contracts and Reputation 2
1 Introduction
External auditors are frequently paid according to a scale of fees set for each class of
worker-hours used during the audit, which in turn depends on the ability and/or the
historical productivity of the human resources engaged in the process. Although the
total number of worker-hours can be di¤erent for each client rm according to its size,
the unitary fees are the same for all clients and the fulllment of this plan of hours is
indeed not certied ex post by other agents. Furthermore, the task of the auditor is
considered fully attained with the preparation of a report about the truthfulness or the
veracity of the nancial statements. However, the audit process that constitutes the
background for the opinion contained in this report is seldom evaluated or audited by
a third party.1 All of this means that in practice the audit rm is rewarded in advance
and that its compensation scheme is no contingent neither on the quantity nor on the
quality of the audit e¤ort actually exerted.
Both the no contingent nature of this reward scheme and the lack of monitoring on
the audit activity rise interesting questions about the actual incentives that external
auditors have to do their job properly. The central hypothesis of this paper is that
the answer to this issue seems to come from the prospective opportunities o¤ered to
the auditors by the market. These opportunities can materialize through the incor-
poration of new clients or the renovation of the contracts open with the current ones.
Accordingly, they can be interpreted as implicit and dynamic incentives similar to
those known in contract theory as career concerns.
On the other side of the auditing contract, we have the client rm, and more speci-
cally, its manager. In the context of the audit relationship, the main action undertaken
by the manager concerns the announcement of the companys nancial statements,
which constitutes the major input for the auditors task. Nevertheless, the plenty of
scandals related to the manipulation of these statements observed especially during
the last decade, supports strongly the choice of modelling the managers report as a
non-truthtelling and strategic behavior referred to as earning management. As an im-
portant part of the managers incentives seems to come from his future employment
opportunities, it is reasonable to conjecture that the stimulus of earning management
also stems from his implicit incentives.2 As a consequence, we argue that career con-
cerns also o¤er a suitable approach to explain the main driving force of this managerial
1 In 2002, U.S. Congress past the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, hereafter), the most important securi-
ties exchange legislation over the last two decades in order to guarantee the transparency in nancial
markets. Nevertheless, there is no law that demands the existence of an independent rm that certies
external auditorreports.
2 In this case, the implicit incentives for the manager are given by perspectives of promotions or
better outside opportunities.
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behavior.
This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an audit rm and a
client rms manager when the incentives for both agents are implicit. To this end,
starting from a career concerns model in the spirit of Holmström (1999), we innovate
by allowing in each period a sequential game between both parties with a strategic
interaction through their respective disutility functions. In such a game, on the one
side, the leader position is held by the manager, who has to decide about the disclosure
of information on his companys nancial situation through the accounting statements.
On the other side, the auditor observes this signal and has to make a choice about how
much e¤ort he is willing to undertake in order to verify if such a signal represents
reasonably the audited rms nancial position.
Our main nding is that earning management and audit e¤ort are decreasing over
time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both agents. However,
as our innovation introduces a new source of (current) incentives for both agents
actions, the increasing lazy behavior of the auditor may be o¤set if his counterpart
is in an earlier stage of its career. As a result, the model predicts a continuum of
cases depending on which stage of their careers contractual parties are, with two polar
cases. On the one side, we have the best scenario from a social point of view, that
is, the case in which the probability of having non-detected earning management is
minimized. Accordingly, our results suggest that auditing e¤orts should be high when
the auditor is an emerging rm and/or the future employment opportunities for the
manager are large. On the other side, our model also predicts the worst scenario
from a social viewpoint, that is, the situation in which the probability of having non-
detected earning management is maximized. In fact, under our double-career-concerns
approach, non-detected earning management actions are expected to be higher as long
as the manager is at a very early stage of his career, and the auditor is an old rm in
the market.
Thus, our model provides an alternative explanation to recent scandals involving
collusion between auditors and managers to manipulate nancial statements in U.S.3
In fact, most of the previous literature has accounted for these scandals based on
the possible conict of interests that audit rms face when providing jointly auditing
and consulting services (see, among others, Antle, 1984; Simunic, 1984; Firth, 1997;
and Ruiz Barbadillo et al., 2006). In contrast, our approach highlights the relevance of
career concerns held by both parties of audit contracts, but focusing only on the auditing
3 These scandals include, among others, Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Imclone and Adelphia. It is
important to note that our model delivers two conditions to be tested when manipulations were per-
formed: (i) if these companies were run by manager teams with large career concerns, and (ii) if these
audit rms were old participants in the market.
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services. Although a multi-task approach can contribute to improve the understanding
of these scandals, this should constitute the aim of future research.
Our analysis also contributes to clarify the incentives behind the relationship among
shareholders, auditors and managers. Under certain circumstances, our theoretical
framework show ine¢ ciencies in the auditing process given the two-sided career concern
framework. This result supports the existence of either an independent rm or an
independent audit committee inside the board that certies the audit process. This
would improve the quality of the information revealed to nancial markets and mitigate
these ine¢ ciencies.
This paper is related to the abundant literature on career concern for executives
(Fama, 1980; Holmström, 1999; and Meyer and Vickers, 1997). However, to the best
of our knowledge, so far this approach has not be used to model the relationship
between an external auditor and a client rm. Furthermore, a two-sided career concern
framework remains almost unexplored within the contract theory literature. One recent
exception is Song and Thakor (2006), who study the relationship between the Chief
Executive O¢ cer (CEO) and the Board of Directors when both of them have implicit
incentives in a career concerns fashion. They contemplate a project selection setting
in which the CEO has the responsibility for generating project ideas and providing
the board with the information necessary to evaluate them. Their main result is that
whereas the boards career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation
pro-cyclically, the CEOs career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision
of the boards information. Nevertheless, and in contrast to our paper, this work
does not model the relationship between both parties by means of a strategic and
dynamic interaction. Thus, our paper contributes to the contract theory literature by
exploiting a richer environment that incorporates two innovations: a bilateral career
concern setting, and a rst-mover advantage for one the career-concerned agents (the
manager).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 constructs a career concerns model of
audit contract in the spirit of Holmström (1999), but with a sequential game played by
the auditor and the manager in each period. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
of the game and discusses the principal results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and points
up some limitations and extensions. All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we characterize the relationship between three agents with innite hori-
zon: an audit rm, the manager of a client rm, and the market.
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2.1 The manager
The client rms manager decides about the announcement of a signal that we sum-
marize as xt, the account earnings in period t, and whose technology is dened as
follows
xt =  + at + t 8t = 1; 2; :::: (2.1)
where  represents some managerial characteristic like talent or ability which is un-
known not only for the market but also for the manager. However, all agents share
the same prior distribution of this managerial ability described by
  N(m1; 1
h1
);
where m1  E() and h1  1=V () corresponds to the level of precision of . Moreover,
at 2 R represents the level of earning management chosen by the manager at period t
. Finally, t is a stochastic noise term which is independent and identically distributed
as follows
t  N(0; 1
h"
);
where h" corresponds to the level of precision of ".
We assume that the manager is risk neutral and exhibits the following separable
utility function
UM (c; a) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ct   g(at; et)]; (2.2)
where ct > 0 is the consumption at period t and g(:) is an increasing and convex function
in at that represents the disutility of earning management actions to the manager. In
addition, g(:) depends on et, the current auditing e¤ort decision made by the auditor,
what we will detail later. For now, we suppose that g(:) is an increasing and convex
function in et. This reects the idea that the earning management actions are more
costly when the level of anticipated auditing e¤orts are large because in this case it is
more di¢ cult to fool the auditor. Furthermore, we assume that the marginal disutility
of the managerial actions is increasing in the auditing e¤ort. All these assumptions can
be summarized as follows
ga(:)  @g(:)
@at
> 0; gaa(:)  @ga(:)
@at
> 0;
ge(:)  @g(:)
@et
> 0; gee(:)  @ge(:)
@et
> 0;
gae(:)  @ga(:)
@et
> 0:
The earning management decision has two objectives. The rst one has a current
e¤ect and the second one has a long run e¤ect. First, we assume that in each period
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the manager and the auditor play a sequential game in which the manager exhibits a
rst movers advantage. Thus, in each period t, the manager chooses a level of at, and
according to (??) also a signal xt, with the aim of inuencing the e¤ort level exerted
by the auditor in this period. Since the auditor only observes xt, we need to assume
that the level of earnings announced by the manager is a goodsignal for the level of
earning management actions in the sense of that the joint density f(x; a) satises the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).4
Second, the manager decides a level of earning management as a try to inuence,
through the signal xt, the learning process of the market about the managerial ability .
As in the career concerns literature, the link between the past managerial decision and
the unknown managerial characteristic is given by the prospective incomes of top exec-
utives. These may be associated to future employment opportunities for the manager
given by promotions or better outside opportunities. In consequence, we assume that
the incomes associated to future employment opportunities for the manager depend
on the past realizations of the signal xt. This signal in turn depends stochastically on
the managers past decisions about at as pointed out by equation (??). We summarize
these future incomes in the wage function wt(xt 1) that represents the wage paid in
period t based on the vector xt 1 = (x1; :::xt 1). This vector represents a sequence of
realizations of the signal x up to time t  1, what we call history of x.
Since there are a double causality between today earning management actions and
future wages, both the decision rule at(:) and the wage functions wt(:) are determined
simultaneously in equilibrium.
2.2 The Auditor
Since we assume that the audit rm is managed by its owner, we do not distinguish
between the audit rms manager and the audit rm itself, and thus hereafter we
only talk generically about the auditor. The auditor must elaborate a report with his
opinion about the thruthfulness of the signal xt disclosed by the manager. We model
this situation as a new signal rt, the adjusted earnings report at period t, that is, a
number that depends stochastically on the audit e¤orts in the following fashion:
rt = + et + t 8t = 1; 2; :::: (2.3)
where  represents some auditors characteristic like ability or productivity which is
unknown not only for the market and the client rm but also for the auditor. However,
4That is, we assume that fa(x; a) > 0 and that
@
@x

fa(x; a)
f(x; a)

> 0:
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all agents share the following prior distribution of the auditors ability
  N(n1; 1
k1
);
where n1  E() and k1  1=V () corresponds to the level of precision of . In
addition, et  0 represents the level of auditing e¤ort chosen by the auditor at period
t. Finally, t is a stochastic noise term which is independent and identically distributed
as follows
t  N(0;
1
k
);
where k corresponds to the level of precision of .
The auditor is risk neutral and has the following separable utility function
UA( ; e) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ t    (et; xt)] (2.4)
where  t 2 R represents the auditors income at period t and  (:) is an increasing and
convex function in et that measures the disutility of the auditing e¤ort. The function
 (:) also depends on xt, the current signal announced by the manager. We assume
that  (:) is an increasing and convex function in xt. This assumption is based on the
idea that the auditing e¤ort is more costly as long as the level of earning management
actions, underlying in higher level of xt, is larger. This is because it is more di¢ cult for
the auditor to detect a cheating behavior.5 Moreover, we suppose that the marginal
disutility of the auditing e¤ort is decreasing in the signal announced by the manager.
In sum, we are assuming the following situation
 e(:) 
@ (:)
@et
> 0;  ee(:) 
@ e(:)
@et
> 0;
 x(:) 
@ (:)
@xt
> 0;  xx(:) 
@ x(:)
@xt
> 0;
 ex(:) 
@ e(:)
@xt
< 0:
As in the case of the manager, the auditing e¤ort decision has two objectives. Again,
there is one objective that has a current e¤ect and another which has a long run e¤ect.
First, in each period t, the auditor chooses a decision rule (s reaction function) of et,
and according to (2.3) also a signal rt. Since the manager has a rst movers advantage,
he can anticipate this decision rule, which implies nally that the auditor can inuence
the level of earning management actions undertaken by the manager in this period
through the disutility function g(at; et).
In addition, the auditor also decides a level of auditing e¤ort as an attempt to
inuence, through the signal rt, the markets future perception about . In this case,
5Again, the assumption of MLRP is crucial for this fact to be held.
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the underlying driving force that permits the relationship between the past decision
about et and the unknown auditors characteristic  are his implicit incentives. These
career concern-based incentives are given by the auditors incomes associated to the
prospective opportunities arisen from contracts with new clients, and/or the renova-
tion of relationships maintained with some current clients. Thus, we assume that these
incomes depend on the past realizations of the signal rt, which in turn depend stochas-
tically on the auditors past decisions about et as (2.3) establishes.6 We summarize
these future opportunities in the income function  t(rt 1) that represents the incomes
obtained in period t based on the vector rt 1 = (r1; :::rt 1). This vector describes the
history of the signal r up to time t  1.
Given the interaction between today auditing e¤orts and future incomes, both the
decision rule et(:) and the income functions  t(:) are determined simultaneously in
equilibrium.
2.3 The Market
We suppose that the future opportunities for both the manager and the auditor depend
on the assessment of their abilities made by the market. This is an abstract agent who
gathers all available information concerning not only the signals disclosed by the other
two agents in previous periods, but also is able to anticipate perfectly the decision rule
chosen by them in all periods. These two sources of information are though not enough
to reveal fully the realization of the random variables  and . Thus, the market can
only to improve its perception of these unknown characteristics over time through the
following learning processes.
For the managerial ability, given the assumptions made on normality and inde-
pendence, the markets learning process is characterized by the following posterior
distribution7
 j xt  N(mt+1; 1
ht+1
)
with
mt+1  E( j xt) = htmt + hzt
ht + h
=
h1m1 + h"
Pt
s=1 zs
h1 + th
; (2.5)
ht+1  1=V ( j xt) = ht + h = h1 + th; and (2.6)
zt  xt   at (xt 1) (2.7)
6Now we assume implicitly that fe(r; e) > 0 and that the level of reported adjusted earnings rt is
a "good" signal for the level of auditing e¤ort in the sense of that the joint density f(r; e) satises the
MLRP dened as follows
@
@r

fe(r; e)
f(r; e)

> 0:
7See DeGroot (1970).
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Notice that the mean process fmtg is a random walk with incremental variance which
declines to zero as t!1, which means that in the limit  will become fully known.
The intuition of this learning process is that at period t the market observes the
earnings xt announced by the manager, but the former lters this public signal through
the perfect inference of the optimal decision rule at . In other words, the manager tries
to manipulate the earnings in order to inuence the markets posterior perception about
his managerial ability, and in this way, to a¤ect his future wages. However, we assume
that in equilibrium the market is able to anticipate perfectly this cheating behavior
and improve the signal received. This improved signal is denoted by zt, which however
does not reveal fully the realization of the managerial ability because it still keeps a
source of noise arisen from the term t.8
On the auditor side, the markets learning process on the auditing ability is char-
acterized by the following posterior distribution9
 j rt  N(nt+1; 1
kt+1
)
with
nt+1  E( j rt) = ktnt + klt
kt + k
=
k1n1 + k
Pt
s=1 ls
k1 + tk
; (2.8)
kt+1  1=V ( j rt) = kt + k = k1 + tk; and (2.9)
lt  rt   et (rt 1; xt ) (2.10)
As in the case of the managerial ability, the mean process of the audit ability fntg is
also a random walk with incremental precision that diverges as t!1. Hence, in the
limit  also becomes completely known.
The intuition behind of this learning process is the following one. At period t; the
market observes the adjusted earning report rt disclosed by the auditor, but the former
improves this public signal anticipating perfectly the optimal decision rule chosen by
the latter concerning to the level of auditing e¤ort. Despite the auditors attempts to
inuence the markets assessment of his ability and his future incomes, we assume that
in equilibrium the market cannot be confused by the auditors decision. Consequently,
the market constructs an improved signal denoted by lt, which still contains a noisy
element t that prevents to know perfectly the realization of the auditing characteristic
.10
An illustration of the timing of the game is given by the following gure when
T = 2:
8 In fact, from (2.1) and (2.7) we know that zt =  + t, and hence, ztjxt 1  N(mt; 1ht + 1h ).
9See DeGroot (1970).
10 In fact, from (2.3) and (2.10) we known that lt = + t, and thus, ltjrt 1  N(nt; 1kt + 1k ).
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3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
According to the timing of the problem, the managers optimal decision at (xt 1; rt 1)
and the auditors optimal decision et (rt 1; xt ) are the result of a sequential game
played by both agents at period t: In this game, the manager exhibits a rst movers
advantage. In consequence, we need to apply backward induction in each period, which
means to characterize the solution of this game as a problem with two stages.
Likewise, since we assume that the agents are risk neutral and forward looking
for innite periods, and that there is neither borrowing nor saving, this problem can
be written as a dynamic program at t = 1. In this formulation, the agents choose a
sequence of actions that maximizes their expected utilities and characterizes the path
of sub-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game.11 Furthermore, we assume that
shareholders assess both managers ability and auditors productivity inside each of
both competitive labor markets. This means that shareholders are the principals in
the two agency relationships. In addition, we restrict our model to the case when all
the bargaining power is on the agents hands in both markets.
11The assumption that there is neither saving nor borrowing for the manager means that ct = wt
for all t. Notice that this assumption implies that we do not need to assume that the capital market
is perfect.
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Since the relevant variables are functions of the history of the signals r and x -
unknown at time t = 1-, we apply the unconditional expectation to the objective
functions. Finally, all this leads us to the problem described by the following two
steps.
I. The Auditors Problem. For a given sequence of random variables fxtg1t=1,
which has implicit a sequence of managers actions fatg1t=1, the auditor chooses the
non-stochastic sequence of reaction functions

et(r
t 1; xt)
	1
t=1
that solves the following
program:
max
fet(:)g1t=1
EUA( ; e) =
1X
t=1
t 1[E t(rt 1)  E (et(rt 1); xt)] (3.1)
s:t:
 t(r
t 1) = E(rt j rt 1) = E( j rt 1) + et(rt 1) 8t = 1; 2; ::: (3.2)
where constraint (3.2) represents the auditors incomes that a competitive and risk
neutral principal sets in each period t. Notice that we assume that the prospective
incomes for the auditor depend on the level of past reported adjusted earnings rt 1.
This modelling choice is based on the idea that the external auditor are hired directly
by the shareholders or other body autonomous of the manager such as the board of
directors or the controller of the company. This justies that we can model the future
opportunities the market o¤ers to the auditor as dependent on his adjusted earnings
report.
II. The Managers Problem. Taking into account the sequence of non-
stochastic reaction functions

et(r
t 1; xt)
	1
t=1
, the manager chooses the sequence of
non-stochastic earning management actions

at (xt 1; rt 1)
	1
t=1
, which in turn deter-
mines the sequence of random signals fxt g1t=1 so that
max
fat(:)g1t=1
EUM (w; a) =
1X
t=1
t 1[Ewt(xt 1)  Eg(at(xt 1); et(rt 1; xt))] (3.3)
s:t:
wt(x
t 1) = E(xt j xt 1) = E( j xt 1) + at(xt 1) 8t = 1; 2; ::(3.4)
where now constraint (3.4) represents the managerial wages that a competitive and risk
neutral principal sets in each period t. Thus, the prospective incomes for the auditor
depend on the level of earnings announced by the manager in the past. In this contract,
the principals are the shareholders or the board of directors, who are assumed to be
autonomous of the manager.
The next statement characterizes the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium of the game described by the auditors and the
managers problem is characterized by the vector of sequences f(at ; et (xt ); wt ; t )g1t=1.
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In this equilibrium,

at (xt 1; rt 1); et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
represents the sequence of
non-stochastic SPNE proles of the game played between the manager and the auditor
at each period. Moreover, fxt g1t=1 denotes the sequence of random signals announced
by the manager when he decides to exert the sequence of optimal earning management
actions fat g1t=1. Finally, wt and t represent the wage sequences of the manager and
the auditor, respectively.
Notice that the principal anticipates perfectly the SPNE prole (at ; et (xt )) and
uses these correct conjectures to lter the signals disclosed by both the manager and
the auditor. This implies that the market uses signals zt 1 and lt 1 instead xt 1 and
rt 1, respectively. All this together with the learning processes described by (2.6) and
(2.9) allow to write the constraints of the problem as follows
 t(r
t 1) = nt(lt 1) + et (r
t 1; xt ) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (3.5)
and
wt(x
t 1) = mt(zt 1) + at (x
t 1; rt 1) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (3.6)
where zt 1 = (z1; :::zt 1) and lt 1 = (l1; :::lt 1). Taking expectations on (3.5), with
auditing e¤ort xed and non-contingent, yields
E t(r
t 1) = Ent(lt 1) + Eet (r
t 1; xt ) 8t = 1; 2; ::::
=
k1n1
kt
+
k
kt
t 1X
s=1
[n1 + es   Ees(rs 1; xs)] + Eet (rt 1; xt ) (3.7)
Hence, for a non-stochastic equilibrium path of auditing e¤orts

et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
, the
marginal return to es in period t for all s < t does not depend on the past because
@E t(r
t 1)
@es
=
k
kt
 t (3.8)
A similar line of reasoning for the managers problem leads to the marginal return to
as in period t for all s < t does not depend on the past neither since
@Ewt(x
t 1)
@as
=
h
ht
 t: (3.9)
Thus, the next lemma states a useful property concerning marginal returns to both
agentsactions for characterizing the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2. The present value of the marginal return to both auditing e¤ort and
earning management is decreasing over time.
On the side of costs, note that the marginal expected cost to es is equal to 	(es),
the expected marginal cost to es so that
@E (es; xs)
@es
= E 0e(es; xs)  	(es; xs):
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Moreover, the marginal expected cost to managerial actions as is given by
g0a(a

t ; e

t (x

t )):
After combining the properties of marginal returns and marginal disutility, the follow-
ing proposition characterizes the major feature of the equilibrium path of both parties
actions.
Proposition 3.3. The optimal level of auditing e¤ort and earning management de-
creases over time.
Let us explain the intuition of this result for the auditor case. As long as the audi-
tors career elapses -the managers career ceteris paribus-, his auditing e¤ort exhibits
a decreasing (present value of) marginal return and an increasing marginal disutility.
Since only the incremental disutility depends on e¤ort, the only way to maintain the
marginal condition of optimality is by means of decreasing auditing actions. Notice
that it is crucial for the auditor exert less e¤ort over time since his incentives to build
a reputation also decline. In fact, the learning process on the precision of his ability
described by expression (2.9) means that the uncertainty about the auditing ability,
1=kt, goes to zero. As a consequence, the implicit incentives provided by futures oppor-
tunities for the auditor are dissipated over time and thereby, auditing actions become
useless.
It is important to point out that this analysis is true for a given level of optimal
announced earnings xt , that is, assuming that the managers career is xed. Neverthe-
less, as Proposition 3.3 establishes, when t!1 for the manager, earning management
actions at also go to zero. Accordingly, the optimal signal xt declines in a stochastic
sense because. Note that the assumption  ex(:) < 0 guarantees that the marginal
disutility function to the auditing e¤ort shifts in when t!1 for the manager. Thus,
this also drives the level of optimal auditing e¤ort to zero even in cases in which the
auditor be in early stages of his career and his marginal return be far away from zero.
All this implies directly the following result.
Corollary 3.4. For a given level of prospective opportunities for the audit, he will
spent lower e¤ort when he faces a manager with lower career concerns incentives.
Proposition 3.3 also states that nancial statement manipulations decrease over
time as the incentives to build a reputation for the manager decline as well. Again, these
implicit incentives disappear because of the uncertainty about the managerial ability
vanishes as the managers career passes. According to (2.1), this induces stochastically
a smaller xt over time, which, as we discussed above, has e¤ects on auditing e¤ort
decisions.
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Furthermore, we can observe from the marginal optimality conditions of the audi-
tors problem that when t!1, and for a given level of optimal signal xt , the optimal
auditing e¤ort et goes to zero. The assumption gae(:) > 0 implies that the marginal
disutility function to the managerial action shifts out when t ! 1 for the auditor,
which increases the level of optimal earning management. This suggests that a con-
tractual relationship with an auditor with low career concerns could o¤set the lack of
incentives by the manager to manipulate nancial statements when he is at the last
stages of his career and the marginal return to these actions is small. The next result
follows then directly.
Corollary 3.5. For a given level of prospective opportunities for the manager, he will
follow higher earning management actions when he faces an auditor with lower career
concerns incentives.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an auditor and a client
rms manager when the incentives for both parties are implicit as in the career con-
cerns literature. Our results are twofold. First, earning management and auditing
e¤ort are decreasing over time as the present value of the marginal return to these
actions is also decreasing, and thus, incentives to build a reputation decline for both
agents. Second, as a result of a strategic interaction between the auditor and the
manager through their disutility functions, the actions undertaken by each agent in a
given period are additionally inuenced by the current actions or signals chosen by his
counterpart.
As a consequence, the combination of these two ndings suggests that the e¤ort
exerted by each agent will depend not only on the incentives provided by his own
career concerns, but also on the implicit incentives of his counterpart. This implies,
on the one hand, that audit e¤ort in a given period should be higher when the auditor
is an emerging rm and/or the future employment opportunities for the client rms
manager are larger. On the other hand, one should expect that earning management
actions be higher as long as the prospective opportunities for the manager are larger
and/or the auditor is an older rm in the market.
Two key underlying assumptions allow these results to emerge. First, we suppose
that markets learning processes of both managerial talent and auditor ability are
so that uncertainty about these abilities vanishes over time. Hence, the usefulness
of actions undertaken and signals disclosed by agents is also dissipated. Second, we
model the manager-auditor relationship in each period as a sequential game in which
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the strategic interaction is provided through the e¤orts disutility functions of both
agents. Thus, the assumptions made in connection with the cross-e¤ects of actions
and signals on the marginal disutilities are crucial to obtain the second result.
All this suggests some extensions that could jeopardize the robustness of the con-
clusions attained here. The rst one is the inclusion of a learning process in which
ability follows a noisy process and thus, varies over time. Since this additional noise
prevents that ability can be known with full precision, the sequence of optimal e¤orts
could not be necessarily decreasing over time. The second avenue of extensions is mod-
elling the manager-auditor relationship under other frameworks, either by modifying
the nature and timing of the game played between both agents or by considering other
strategic interaction links between them.
Finally, a third line of future research is to take into account di¤erent types of
auditing e¤orts. This extension is especially relevant if one considers that in practice
audit testing is typically categorized according to the type of risk that auditor faces:
inherent risk, control risk and detection risk. In this sense, the extension of our model
to a multi-task career concerns environment à la Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999)
seems pertinent. This could be a good starting point for examining how any comple-
mentarity and substitutability between these three class of auditing activities could
a¤ect the strength of implicit incentives.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Substituting the solution

at (xt 1; rt 1)
	1
t=1
of the
Managers Problem into the accounting earnings process given by (2.1), we obtain the
sequence of optimal random signals fxt g1t=1. Then, incorporating this sequence in
the reaction function et(:) described by (3.2), we get the sequence of non-stochastic
optimal auditing e¤orts

et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
. Similarly, after substituting the last
sequence into the audit earnings report process described by (2.3), the sequence of
optimal random reports frt g1t=1 is attained. Next, plugging sequences at and xt into
(2.5) allows us to get the conditional expectations of . A similar substitution of
et and rt into (2.8) yields the conditional expectation of . Finally, replacing all of
these previous sequences into constraints (3.2) and (3.4) allows us to nd the vector
of salary sequences fwt ; t g1t=1. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. From (3.8), let us dene t, the present value of the
marginal return to auditing e¤ort at period t, as follows
t =
1X
s=t
s ts, 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.1)
Audit Contracts and Reputation 16
Similarly, using (3.9), dene t, the present value of the marginal return to earning
management at period t, as
t =
1X
s=t
s ts, 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.2)
Given the learning processes about the precision ht and kt described by expres-
sions (2.6) and (2.9), both sequences t and t converge to zero as t ! 1. Hence,
and since  < 1, t and t decline in turn to zero as t!1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. First, the rst-order condition to the auditors prob-
lem, evaluated at the equilibrium path, is given by
t =
1X
s=t
s ts = 	(e

t ; x

t ) 8t = 1; 2; ::::
From Lemma 3.2, t is a declining sequence as t ! 1. Moreover, the function 	(:)
is increasing in et as, by assumption,  (:) is a convex function in et. This implies that
for a given level of optimal announced earnings xt , the equilibrium level of auditing
e¤ort decreases over time.
Second, the rst-order condition to the managers problem, evaluated at the equi-
librium path, corresponds to
t =
1X
s=t
s ts = g0a(a

t ; e

t (x

t )) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.3)
Lemma 3.2 implies that t is a declining sequence as t!1 for the manager. Finally,
the convexity of the function g(:) with respect to at ensures that, for a given level of
auditing e¤ort, the optimal level of earnings management at decreases over time. 
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